📌 In This Deep Dive
Netflix’s The Altruists is based on the true story of the FTX collapse in 2022. The series breaks down how Sam Bankman-Fried and Alameda Research bypassed exchange rules, pledged inflated FTT tokens, and spent customer deposits to fund their moves. Beyond the exchange’s structural collapse, the real timeline traces the hidden $8 billion deficit, CZ’s fatal market move, and the surprising post-bankruptcy resolution tied to Anthropic. Here is a complete breakdown of the financial mechanics, secret credit overrides, and real-world events that brought down the FTX empire.
A tremendous amount of research went into The Altruists. Not only is it a series that is a real pleasure to watch, but it also takes you inside the secret rooms of a painfully true story: the events that led to the bankruptcy of the crypto exchange platform FTX, considered the biggest financial scandal of modern times.
The series is inspired by the reporting published in New York Magazine after the scandal broke, and while the title draws inspiration from the uplifting mission the two protagonists had in mind at the start of their journey (donating 99% of their earnings to charitable causes, according to the philosophy of effective altruism), most of the story focuses on the individual decisions and mechanisms that gave rise to the fraud and the bankruptcy.
This time, explaining the true story behind the Netflix series isn’t just a matter of separating fact from fiction like we usually do. No, this time most of the questions revolve around how FTX and Alameda Research worked in detail, which specific choices caused the bankruptcy, what was done after the fact to prevent it from happening again, and the events that triggered the crisis. An undertaking that would normally require a financial expert, but this time you’re in luck: the writer behind these lines also happens to have a passion for finance and crypto, so if you were looking for a thorough article that tells the true story behind The Altruists in a clear and simple way, you’ve come to the right place.
We will tackle this story by answering the questions that come up most frequently after watching the series.
How Sam Bankman-Fried and Caroline Ellison Got Rich in the Early Days of Alameda Research
At first, Sam Bankman-Fried and Caroline Ellison were two young employees at Jane Street Capital, a Manhattan-based investment firm. In 2017, the two founded Alameda Research, a hedge fund set up to turn a profit in the cryptocurrency market, which back then was going through one of its classic cycles of massive hype.
In the first episode of The Altruists, we see Sam and Caroline working together on crypto trading operations, waking up at a very specific hour to run their trades and pulling in practically guaranteed profits every single day. What were they doing in detail?
The two protagonists were taking advantage of a practice known as crypto arbitrage, something many industry experts were aware of, but few had the means to capitalize on. Put simply, back then there was a constant mismatch between the value of crypto on Asian markets and its value on Western exchanges, purely due to higher local demand. At any given moment, a bitcoin on a Japanese or Korean exchange was worth 10 to 15% more than on an American exchange. It was a temporary anomaly that would naturally fix itself as soon as supply and demand rebalanced, but it opened up a very specific window of opportunity: if you had substantial capital and managed to build a setup capable of moving funds rapidly from the United States to Asian markets every day, you could make guaranteed profits with low risk.
How Crypto Arbitrage Works in Detail
What Sam Bankman-Fried did back then is now part of historical knowledge, and he explained it himself in 2021. Every day, they used their entire capital to buy bitcoin on a U.S. exchange. Then they sent those bitcoins to their wallet on a Japanese exchange and resold them immediately. Based on the price difference between bitcoin on the two markets, they managed to make a 10 to 15% profit in the span of a couple of hours. They called it the “Kimchi premium,” the price gap that popular cryptocurrencies had on Asian markets back then.
Then came the hardest part, the one that required setting an alarm in the middle of the night: the money earned on the Japanese exchange had to quickly get back to their American accounts, so they could repeat the entire operation the next day using the new available capital. To do this, they made instant bank transfers right before the close of the business day in Japan, ensuring the capital would arrive in their American accounts by morning. This way, the next day they could take their entire capital (which in the meantime had grown by another 10 to 15% in profit) and do it all over again. This is the concept of “compound interest,” which can generate exponential profits simply by reinvesting what was previously earned.
For all this to be possible, bank accounts were needed in both the United States and Asia, something that wasn’t accessible to just anyone. SBF and Caroline Ellison had set up companies in both territories, allowing the mechanism to work. In addition, speed was critical: given the volatility of bitcoin at the time, waiting days to resell wasn’t an option, the purchase in America and sale in Japan had to happen as quickly as possible. The operation required commitment and speed, but it brought virtually guaranteed returns.
Today, the price gap for crypto across different markets is much smaller (usually under 1%), so the practice of crypto arbitrage as carried out by the protagonists of The Altruists would no longer be profitable. There are bots that still operate this way at lightning speed, but it is no longer a process that can be done manually like back then. In 2018, however, Sam and Caroline eventually reached a point where they were moving around $25 million every day. That was the capital SBF later used to found FTX.
What Is FTX and What Led to Its Bankruptcy?
FTX was born in 2019 with the ambition of becoming one of the most popular crypto exchanges in the world, replacing the mainstream platforms of the time, which were slow and cumbersome. To get it off the ground, Sam Bankman-Fried moved to Hong Kong, a territory that didn’t yet have heavy regulations that would slow down the platform’s setup.
However, there was the problem of initial capital. Alameda Research’s previous profits weren’t going to be enough, and they needed investors willing to take a bet on the project. But in the meantime, the crypto market was already going through one of its down cycles, and no one was willing to put up large sums of money at that point. The Altruists adds a cinematic perspective to this: from what we see in the show, Changpeng “CZ” Zhao, the founder of Binance (the biggest crypto exchange at the time), had made sure that no major investor would back the FTX project. But it’s worth taking this detail with a grain of salt.
In the actual history of that period, CZ decided to invest directly in FTX himself, offering the necessary capital (the exact figure was never revealed) in exchange for 20% of FTX. According to stories that emerged over time, CZ saw the growth of another exchange as a benefit for the entire crypto world, as its global expansion would bring new users to Binance as well. There were even cross-promotional campaigns designed to boost user numbers on both platforms.
On paper, there was no reason for an exchange like FTX to go bankrupt. Financial exchanges are supposed to work in a straightforward way: users deposit funds, those funds stay in the exchange’s accounts, users buy crypto, and they pay a commission. When selling, there is another commission, and then users can withdraw their money, which goes right back into their bank accounts. On the surface, nothing too different from what banks and stock brokers have always done.
So what were the specific practices at FTX that led to the 2022 disaster? We can trace them back to three separate fraudulent practices, which together created the massive hole that eventually came to light.
The details below on how FTX and Alameda Research worked are based on information available in Wikipedia articles like this one and the investigative reporting published in the aftermath of the scandal.
Problem #1: Shared Bank Accounts with Alameda Research
Crypto exchanges back then all had one major problem: it was virtually impossible for a crypto operator to get a corporate checking account at a traditional bank. The few that managed to do so back then (like Coinbase and Kraken) had poured time and effort into complying with every regulation and securing the necessary licenses. Exchanges like FTX and Binance, on the other hand, had no intention of slowing down their growth, so they had to find alternative solutions. Binance itself didn’t even allow users to deposit traditional currencies to buy crypto in its early years (it was purely an exchange for people who already owned crypto). When Binance eventually started letting users buy crypto using everyday currencies, it didn’t rely on traditional banks, but turned to third-party financial services like Advcash, Simplex, or MoonPay.
FTX, however, had a massive advantage in that department: Alameda Research. Alameda’s hedge fund had all the requirements to hold corporate checking accounts in any country, and in fact, it owned multiple accounts under its own name. So, FTX simply piggybacked on Alameda Research’s bank accounts: when users sent money, they deposited it directly into Alameda Research accounts, even though it was technically a separate company. FTX would acknowledge the incoming bank transfer and activate the funds in the user’s account.
But FTX didn’t actually have a bank account of its own: corporate operating expenses were always paid using Alameda Research’s funds. This was also true for FTX employee salaries and the personal expenses of the key figures involved: to circle back to The Altruists, the penthouses, the luxury hotels, the private jets, all of those were expenses billed to Alameda Research’s accounts. And those accounts were the very same ones holding FTX user funds.
Since there was never a careful, diligent accounting department, there was no distinction between Alameda’s capital, FTX’s funds, and user deposits: it was one single, undifferentiated, completely unregulated pot of money sitting quietly in Alameda Research’s accounts.
The problem is obvious: without controls preventing Alameda Research from spending the portion of capital that actually belonged to FTX users, the risk (present from day one) was that user funds could be spent indiscriminately, and if one day every user asked for a withdrawal at the same time, the funds might simply not be there.
The possibility of a mass withdrawal by users was seen as a remote scenario, but in reality, it wasn’t: as we’ll see, all it took was a simple loss of trust triggered by a public leak, and everyone would rush to FTX to pull their funds out.
Problem #2: The infamous safeguard liquidation turned off for Alameda
The second massive problem was that single line of code introduced by the developers to allow Alameda Research to execute transactions that pushed its accounts into negative territory.
Beyond acting as FTX’s “private bank,” Alameda Research also had direct access to the FTX platform to execute trades, just like any other user. This included trading on credit, a feature FTX introduced in two phases across 2019 and 2020. FTX users could trade crypto instruments and derivatives even without depositing the required funds in advance: they could tap into a line of credit offered directly by FTX, much like a bank loan, putting up the crypto held on the platform as collateral in return.
If a credit trade ran into losses and that loss exceeded the value of the collateral, FTX automatically closed the position and sold off the user’s crypto to recover the money. This guaranteed the system’s stability and kept FTX from taking a loss. Starting in 2020, users could borrow crypto or even traditional currencies directly from FTX by putting up their crypto as collateral under the exact same logic: if those funds were used for investments that subsequently went into a loss, the position was automatically liquidated and the collateral sold to recover the deficit.
Right from 2019, however, Sam Bankman-Fried and Caroline Ellison chose to treat Alameda Research as a very special client, instructing Gary Wang (co-founder, CTO, and developer at FTX) to turn off the safeguard liquidation for Alameda. That gave Alameda access to a massive credit line from FTX, which theoretically allowed them to sit in debt by up to $65 billion.
Alameda used this credit line to make its own investments and financial decisions. Through this credit, it could fund startups like Anthropic or SpaceX almost without limits: Alameda could ask FTX for a credit line in dollars and then transfer that capital to external companies. The credit could also be in crypto: for example, Alameda could ask FTX for a loan in Bitcoin, FTX would transfer the Bitcoin from its central wallet to Alameda’s wallet, and Alameda could then sell that Bitcoin, convert it into traditional currency, and use it for its independent investments.
Pay close attention to this last point: when we say FTX transferred crypto from its central wallet to Alameda’s, we are saying that the crypto owned (on paper) by real FTX users was being sold without their consent. It is every crypto investor’s greatest fear: the lack of control over crypto kept on exchanges, which appears on the platform dashboard as owned by the user, but is actually stored in a wallet owned by the exchange. Digital ownership of that crypto actually belongs to the exchange, which theoretically can do whatever it wants with it. This is why the most cautious crypto investors use physical hardware wallets (so-called cold storage) where they send all their purchased crypto: with cold storage, they are the sole owners of the crypto and the only ones who can execute transactions with it.
Returning to Alameda’s credit line on FTX: did collateral capital actually exist? On paper, yes: Alameda requested credit (with the exceptional ability to go negative) by offering the crypto in its possession as collateral. There was, however, another extremely serious exception at its disposal: the ability to obtain FTT tokens (the cryptocurrency created by FTX itself) with virtually no limits.
Problem #3: Alameda’s “infinite FTT loop”
FTT was the native cryptocurrency minted by FTX. FTX could produce it in infinite quantities. Naturally, the standard financial rule of value and scarcity applied: the more currency present on the market, the less value it ultimately holds. Alameda, however, had the ability to receive unlimited amounts of FTT from FTX through a special mechanism that prevented FTT from losing its market value.

Of all the FTT ever created by FTX, only a small fraction (less than 15%) was destined for the open market. The majority of FTT was controlled directly by Alameda. Because of this, it took just a single sizable trade from Alameda to move FTT’s market price significantly.
Furthermore, FTX could mint new FTT tokens at any moment and transfer them privately to Alameda. As long as Alameda didn’t sell them, the price of a single FTT token remained unchanged. This allowed Alameda’s balance sheets to receive direct injections of virtual assets, even though the real value of those assets bore no resemblance to their nominal value: if Alameda had actually tried to sell the FTT in its possession, its market value would have instantly collapsed to zero.
To draw a parallel: imagine Auralcrave owns a virtual asset with a random name, say “AuralCoin.” It holds 90% of the total global supply, and one fine day, it decides to sell almost all of it: the market value of that coin, previously held almost entirely by Auralcrave, would instantly hit zero. In reality, people say the same thing about Bitcoin: owning 1 BTC can be worth tens or hundreds of thousands of dollars, but owning all 21 million (the entire circulating supply) makes it worth zero. If you are the only one holding it, the currency holds no value for anyone else, because market value is determined by an asset’s ability to be traded.
Now let’s return to Alameda and FTX. FTX was able to create FTT without limits and hand them directly to Alameda. Alameda was very careful not to sell them, so as not to drive down their value. However, it could do something else, leveraging the exact functionality offered by FTX: receiving credit (in crypto or traditional currency) by offering those FTT as collateral. In practice, Alameda had a potentially infinite supply of collateral to obtain whatever credit it wanted from FTX, and it could use that credit both for independent investments and to pump volume on FTX, boosting the platform’s prestige. And so began what the Financial Times in 2022 dubbed the Alameda-FTX “death spiral”. The exact same loop surfaced at one point on Reddit, labeled the “infinite money” scheme.
To recap: Alameda held FTX’s money pools, including user funds. On top of that, it could access a virtually unlimited line of credit by offering as collateral ad-hoc FTT tokens regularly received from FTX. And with that credit line, it was allowed to execute trades that sank into negative territory without triggering any alerts.
What could possibly go wrong?
The legendary eight-billion-dollar hole
In June 2022, Sam Trabucco, co-CEO of Alameda, went deep into Alameda Research’s books and uncovered the full extent of the accumulated debt. With safeguard liquidations turned off, Alameda had been operating freely for years without its transactions ever showing up as negative on its balance sheets. After all, FTT tokens kept pouring into their assets, inflating their official books. But in reality, Alameda Research’s revenue-to-expense balance was roughly 8 billion dollars in the red. At first, only Sam Trabucco, Sam Bankman-Fried, and Caroline Ellison knew about this, with Nishad Singh (FTX’s lead engineer) and Gary Wang finding out later.
FTX and Alameda were therefore sitting on a timer. If at any point, say due to a sudden market crisis, they needed actual liquidity, they had none. And this applied also to FTX user funds, the “problem no. 1” discussed earlier: for years, there were no separate bank accounts holding customer money, as everything was mixed into Alameda’s balance sheet. A balance sheet that stayed afloat year after year thanks to the FTT tokens continuously appearing among their virtual assets.
Sam Bankman-Fried and Caroline Ellison decided to keep everything quiet and work to plug the eight-billion-dollar hole before it was too late. Sam Trabucco stepped down from Alameda Research in August 2022. SBF and Caroline began planning moves to recover the loss, but their time was already running out. On November 2, 2022, just a few months after the hole was discovered, the crypto outlet CoinDesk published this article outlining how heavily FTT weighed on the balance sheet: 40% of Alameda’s assets were made up of FTT tokens, and many of them were being used as collateral for lines of credit.
CZ, the founder of Binance, read that article and, a few days later, brought the house of cards crashing down with a single tweet.
How CZ triggered the FTX collapse
Remember how CZ invested in FTX right at its inception? The Binance founder held a 20% stake in FTX for a long time. Then, in 2021, the official divorce between FTX and Binance was announced: FTX framed the decision as a way to reassure regulators about its genuine commitment to securing the licenses required to operate in the United States (back then, Binance was under intense scrutiny from compliance regulators around the world), and Binance accepted the offer gladly. Especially since, in the meantime, SBF never missed an opportunity to paint CZ and Binance in a bad light across public and private crypto circles.
As a result of that buyout, Binance received $2.1 billion in Binance USD and FTT (a figure CZ himself would reveal in his famous November 2022 tweet). CZ held on to that pile of FTT for months. Then, after reading the CoinDesk article detailing FTT’s heavy weight on Alameda’s balance sheet, and with relations between him and Sam Bankman-Fried completely souring, on November 6, 2022, CZ posted the tweet that sparked the disaster:
CZ’s tweet is full of scathing allusions. He speaks of “recent revelations that have come to light” (the massive chunk of FTT on Alameda’s balance sheet) and frames FTX as a project that is “publicly failing”. The underlying logic was clear: if most of the assets at Alameda Research, the trading firm behind FTX, consisted of FTT (with many of them pledged as collateral for debt operations), it took just a plunge in FTT’s valuation to bankrupt both Alameda and FTX. And CZ held the lion’s share of FTT available on the open market: roughly 23 million FTT out of a total 30 to 45 million trading in public hands, with the rest locked away in Alameda’s reserves.
With that tweet, CZ on one hand sent FTT’s valuation into a tailspin, seeing its price plunge by 90% over the next three days, while on the other hand publicly raising doubts about the health of FTX and Alameda, instantly driving users to sell off assets and withdraw their capital. So, while FTT’s value was crashing miserably, FTX was forced to handle a massive wave of user withdrawals: precisely the highly improbable scenario that could expose FTX and Alameda’s liquidity hole.
From that moment on, events unfolded frantically. November 6 was the day of CZ’s tweet. On November 8, FTX froze user withdrawals after receiving $6 billion in requests over the previous three days. Just a few hours later, still on November 8, Binance and FTX announced Binance’s intention to acquire FTX. The very next day, November 9, Binance announced it was walking away from the acquisition plan, citing issues in FTX’s books.
In the days immediately following, further rescue attempts were made, to no avail. Meanwhile, the figures at the center of the fraudulent practices had begun speaking publicly, with Caroline Ellison revealing to The Wall Street Journal on November 12 that SBF and the others knew user funds were being transferred to Alameda Research.
FTX and Alameda filed for bankruptcy on November 11: the FTX empire was officially over, and with it, Sam Bankman-Fried’s aura as the “golden boy” of the crypto world.
The ending of The Altruists explained and the Anthropic irony
When Sam Bankman-Fried was arrested and subsequently convicted, he was actually trying to recover the missing liquidity to cover the debts of FTX and Alameda. But the primary crime had already been established, and it was the very charge he would be convicted of in 2023: wire fraud, meaning the use of electronically received capital for purposes other than those for which it was sent. In other words, Sam Bankman-Fried’s guilt lay primarily in what was done with the funds deposited by FTX users.
Regarding the financial hole itself, Bankman-Fried spent months claiming that FTX would ultimately be able to repay all its debts. From his perspective, the capital Alameda Research borrowed from FTX was mainly poured into separate investments, one of which in particular had the potential to become such a massive success that it could cover the entire deficit: its stake in Anthropic.
In April 2022, Anthropic announced a capital raise of nearly $600 million to support the training costs of its new Claude model. Alameda and FTX participated with a total of $500 million, securing an Anthropic stake that would later amount to 7.8%. This was an asset still held by FTX and Alameda, meaning it could eventually be sold to generate liquidity.
Sam Bankman-Fried’s strategy to avoid insolvency rested entirely on this. Once bankruptcy proceedings took hold, however, it became clear that debts had to be settled immediately, with no option to wait and see what Anthropic’s ultimate valuation might reach. In 2024, FTX and Alameda sold their Anthropic shares for $1.34 billion to fund creditor repayments (some creditors preferred to receive Anthropic shares directly rather than selling them). At the time, that figure was considered fair, even though Anthropic’s overall valuation skyrocketed shortly thereafter.
The Altruists premiered on Netflix on November 19, 2026, the exact same day Anthropic made its stock market debut (a date certainly not chosen by coincidence). By the end of trading, Anthropic reached a total valuation of $1.4 trillion ($1,400 billion). Today, that 7.8% stake in Anthropic is worth precisely what the text on screen at the end of The Altruists states: roughly $100 billion.
There is a subtle irony in all of this. Had Sam Bankman-Fried and Caroline Ellison been granted infinite time to recover their capital, they theoretically would have been fully capable of plugging the hole. This was the distorted logic Bankman-Fried fell into after filing for bankruptcy: firmly believing he could fix everything, viewing financial fraud as nothing more than a simple “misplacement” of user funds.
Yet in the world of finance, time is something you can never take for granted: a crisis can strike out of nowhere and explode with devastating force in a matter of days.

Frequently Asked Questions
Yes. The series dramatizes the real-world collapse of the FTX cryptocurrency exchange and its sister hedge fund, Alameda Research, in November 2022. It covers the secret financial mechanics, code backdoors, and executive decisions by Sam Bankman-Fried, Caroline Ellison, and their inner circle that led to the platform’s downfall and subsequent criminal convictions.
In August 2019, FTX co-founder Gary Wang modified the exchange’s code at Sam Bankman-Fried’s request. By setting a database flag, and disabling the automated risk engine for Alameda’s primary account, the developers allowed Alameda to withdraw funds, make trades, and execute wire transfers even when its account balance was deeply in the red, reaching a line of credit of up to $65 billion without triggering automatic liquidations.
FTX minted hundreds of millions of its native FTT tokens while keeping over 85% of the total supply locked in private reserves. With less than 15% circulating on the open market, Alameda could easily keep FTT’s market price artificially high. Alameda then used its massive, illiquid pile of FTT tokens as paper collateral to borrow real customer deposits (USD and Bitcoin) directly from FTX.
On November 6, 2022, following a leaked CoinDesk report exposing Alameda’s heavy reliance on FTT, Binance CEO CZ announced that Binance would sell its entire position of 23 million FTT tokens (received during its 2021 equity buyout from FTX). Because Binance held over half of FTT’s freely tradable public market float, the announcement sent FTT’s price into a downward spiral, breaking the $22 liquidation threshold for Alameda’s loans and triggering a $6 billion user bank run that FTX could not fulfill.
In April 2022, Alameda used $500 million in funds to acquire a 7.8% equity stake in Anthropic, the AI company behind Claude. During bankruptcy proceedings in 2024, the estate sold those shares for $1.34 billion to repay victims. Following Anthropic’s subsequent explosive growth and public market valuation, that original 7.8% stake grew to be worth roughly $100 billion. The irony lies in Sam Bankman-Fried’s belief that his illiquid venture investments would eventually cover the deficit, ignoring the reality that commingling user money is wire fraud and financial markets do not grant infinite time to cover an active bank run.
